My philosophical research revolves around two main projects. The first concerns the representational theory of consciousness and the role it can play in constructing a scientific explanation of consciousness. The second project investigates the role of consciousness in grounding meaning, concepts, and non-conscious mental states.
I'm involved in a number of computing projects that support research in philosophy:
PhilPapers: Online Research in Philosophy. David Chalmers and I launched PhilPapers in 2009. It's a search index and structured bibliography of philosophy books and articles with a number of crowd-sourcing features. I continue to maintain PhilPapers. Today, PhilPapers has over two million index entries, 6,000 bibliographies, 170,000 registered users, and 650 editors.
PhilEvents, a comprehensive calendar of events in philosophy worldwide.
PhilJobs, the most complete database of jobs in philosophy.
Digging by Debating, an interdisciplinary project to integrate visualization techniques, bibliometrics, automated analysis, and crowd-sourcing into a tool that will generate new insights into the philosophical literature (in progress)
xEvents, a Blogger-like service to create PhilEvents-style academic calendars
PhilSurvey, a large scale follow up on the PhilPapers Philosophical Survey
Intermodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are fully determined by their contents. In contrast, intramodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are determined by their contents together with their intentional modes or manners of representation, which are non-representational features corresponding roughly to the sensory modalities. This paper discusses a kind of experience that militates for an intermodal representationalist view: intermodal experiences, experiences that unify experiences in different modalities. I argue that such experiences are much easier to explain on the intermodal view. [Contact me for a copy]